NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 80 | Number 6

Article 8

9-1-2002

First Union v. SunTrust and the Delaware
Experience: An Analysis of Deal Protection
Measures
Paul A. Kuebler

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Paul A. Kuebler, First Union v. SunTrust and the Delaware Experience: An Analysis of Deal Protection Measures, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 2109
(2002).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol80/iss6/8

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

First Union v. SunTrust and The Delaware Experience: An
Analysis of Deal Protection Measures
In August 2001, the North Carolina Business Court ("NCBC")
entered a judgment that dealt a fatal blow to SunTrust's attempted
breakup of the First Union-Wachovia merger.' SunTrust had urged
the NCBC to dispense with the lockout provision2 and termination
fee 3 in the First Union-Wachovia merger agreement. The NCBC
granted half of SunTrust's request by discarding the lockout
provision, while upholding the termination fee.'
The NCBC, lacking North Carolina precedent, 5 struggled to
develop an appropriate standard of review for deal protection
provisions and turned to Delaware for guidance. After an extensive

1. First Union Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., No. 01-CVS-10075 (N.C. Bus. Ct. Aug.
10, 2001), at http://wwv.ncbusinesscourt.net/opinions/2001%20NCBC%2009A.pdf (last
visited May 6, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). On a number of
occasions prior to December 2000, SunTrust and Wachovia had explored the possibility of
entering into a business combination. Id. 92. Wachovia chose not to pursue a
combination with SunTrust, instead opting to bargain with First Union. Id.
100-03.
During the first half of 2001, First Union and Wachovia entered negotiations, leading to a
formal merger agreement. Id.
104-18. On May 14,2001, SunTrust publicly announced
its unsolicited proposal to acquire Wachovia. Id. 119. Thereafter, First Union and
SunTrust disputed two of the deal protection provisions in the First Union-Wachovia
merger agreement in the North Carolina Business Court. Id. 123.
2. Under a lockout provision (or non-termination provision) the target agrees not to
merge with a third party for a significant period of time notwithstanding a negative
shareholder vote.

See ARTHUR FLEISCHER, JR. & ALEXANDER R. SUSSMAN,

TAKEOVER DEFENSE 15-79 (6th ed. 2002). The lockout provision in the First UnionWachovia merger agreement provided that the merger agreement would remain in place
until January 2002, even if it was rejected by the Wachovia shareholders at the scheduled
August 3,2001 shareholder meeting. First Union, No. 01-CVS-10075, 3.
3. A termination fee (or breakup fee) is a payment that must be made by one party
to the other if certain triggering events occur. See FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 2,
at 15-90 to 15-91. A very common trigger is the failure of shareholders to approve the
merger. Id. Although the termination fee in the First Union-Wachovia merger agreement
was based on a complicated financial structure, it would require Wachovia to pay $780
million, or 6% of the total transaction value, if the merger was not consummated. First
Union, No. 01-CVS-10075,
3, 143.
4. On August 3,2001, Wachovia shareholders voted to approve the merger with First
Union. An estimated 55% to 60% of the 203 million Wachovia shares outstanding were
voted in approval. Carrick Mollenkamp, First Union and Wachovia Shift Focus to
Merging, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6,2001, at A3.
5. The appellate courts in North Carolina have not had the opportunity to address
issues involving the appropriate balance between shareholder power and board authority
in corporate mergers. FirstUnion, No. 01-CVS-10075, 2.
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review of Delaware case law addressing the subject, 6 the NCBC
concluded that "refocus[ing] on the relationship between shareholder
rights and directors [sic] duty to make informed decisions in good
faith would be more helpful."7 The NCBC then promulgated North

Carolina's standard of review for deal protection provisions, stating,
the action of the directors is entitled to a strong presumption
of reasonableness and validity, including noncoercion, and
the court should not intervene unless the shareholder can
rebut that presumption by clear and convincing evidence
that the deal protection provisions were actionably coercive,
or that the deal protection provisions prevented the
directors from performing their statutory duties.8
The standard of review developed by the NCBC is an
oversimplification of the realities surrounding deal protection
provisions and creates an unworkable standard. For example,
Delaware has suggested at least three different standards of review
depending on the circumstances surrounding the deal protection
provisions.9 The decision also does not adequately define a board's
fiduciary duty in the context of corporate mergers, an area void of
North Carolina case law.1" This Recent Development highlights the
weakness of the NCBC's standard of review and attempts to extract a
definition of a North Carolina board's fiduciary duty from the First
Union decision. Moreover, this Recent Development suggests how
the NCBC would have decided the case had it used a more robust
standard of review, been more cognizant of the process used by First
Union and Wachovia's boards in arranging the transaction, and been
more careful with its use of non-North Carolina decisions, which it
used as persuasive precedent.
Taken as a whole, Delaware law addressing deal protection
provisions is in a state of flux." Despite this current unrest, the
history of Delaware deal protection law dates back to the early 1980s,
when Delaware courts were forced to "choose between two
competing models as to how corporation law should address contests
6. For an overview of Delaware standards of review and deal protection provisions,
see generally William T. Allen et al., Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards
of Review in Delaware CorporationLaw, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287 (2001); Leo E. Strine, Jr.,
CategoricalConfusion: Deal Protection Measures in Stock-for-Stock Merger Agreements,
56 Bus. LAW. 919 (2001).
7. First Union, No. 01-CVS-10075, 1 62.
8. Id. 70.
9. See infra notes 15-30 and accompanying text.
10. See supranote 5.
11. See Allen, supra note 6, at 1292; Strine, supranote 6, at 920,923, 926-27.
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for corporate control.' 1 2 Decisions indicate that the director-3
centered, as opposed to the shareholder-centered, model won out.'

The Delaware Chancery Court, however, has increasingly been
leaning more towards shareholder rights.' 4 More importantly, within
Delaware at least three standards of review exist for deal protection
provisions, depending on the surrounding circumstances. 5 The
traditional business judgment rule, the oldest and most lenient
standard of review, states that boards' decisions are presumed valid

unless a plaintiff meets its burden in proving that a board has violated
its duty of care or loyalty. 6 Under the enhanced scrutiny standard,
courts review both the board's decisionmaking process and the
board's final action.'7
Enhanced scrutiny applies in two situations: (1) when a board
"adopts a defensive mechanism in response to an alleged threat to
corporate control or policy" (Unocal); or (2) in the context of a
transaction involving a sale of control and/or break-up of the
company (Revlon). 18 When a board implements anti-takeover
measures, there arises "the omnipresent specter that a board may be
acting primarily in its own interests [management entrenchment],
rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders."' 9 Because
of this potential conflict of interest, the first level of enhanced
scrutiny review, known as Unocal review, imposes a special burden on
directors prior to their enjoyment of the benefits of the business
judgment rule.2° Under Unocal, the board has the burden to establish
that (1) it reasonably perceived that the unsolicited takeover bid was
12. Strine, supra note 6, at 925.
13. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154-55 (Del.
1989) (declining to hold that directors must abandon a deliberately conceived corporate
plan); Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1357 (Del. 1985) (sanctioning the
poison pill); Strine, supra note 6, at 925.
14. See Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1292-93 (Del. 1998)
(holding a slow-hand pill adopted by the board invalid); Paramount Communications, Inc.
v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34,36 (Del. 1994) (enjoining Paramount from proceeding
with measures that would operate to discourage competing bidders); Robin Sidel, Leo
Strine Issues Rulings, and Entertains His Audiences, as Judge on Takeover Cases, WALL
ST. J., June 26,2001, at C1.
15. Edward D. Herlihy, Takeover Law and Practice 2001, in CONTESTS FOR
CORPORATE CONTROL 285,299-307 (Dennis J. Block chair, 2002).
16. Id. at 300. To demonstrate that a board has violated its duty of care, a plaintiff
must prove that directorial conduct has risen to the level of "gross negligence." Id. To
show that a board has violated its duty of loyalty, a plaintiff must prove that members of
the board engaged in "self-dealing" transactions. Id. at 301.
17. Id. at 302.
18. Id. at 302.
19. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
20. See id.
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a threat to corporate effectiveness and policy, and (2) the defensive
measure adopted was reasonable in response to the threat.2 1 A court
will find a defensive measure to be disproportionate to the threat if it
is either draconian (preclusive or coercive) or if it falls outside a range
of reasonable responses.22 A defensive measure is coercive when it
operates to force management's preferred alternative upon the
stockholders.'
Board actions are preclusive only if they make
alternate transactions "mathematically impossible or realistically
unattainable," not if they simply discourage other bids. 4
The second level of enhanced scrutiny review, known as Revlon
review, is more restrictive to ensure that a board's sole objective is
maximizing shareholder value.' When Revlon applies, the whole
question of defensive provisions becomes moot.2 6 In Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,27 the Delaware Supreme Court
described two situations which implicate Revlon duties: first, "when a
corporation initiates an active bidding process seeking to sell itself or
to effect a business reorganization involving a clear break-up of the
company," and second, "where, in response to a bidder's offer, a
target abandons its long-term strategy and seeks an alternative
transaction involving the breakup of the company."'
When
Delaware courts find an actual conflict of interest that affects a
majority of the directors approving a transaction, they apply the most
exacting standard, entire fairness review, by determining whether a
transaction is entirely fair to stockholders 9 Conflicts of interest may
arise when directors sit on the boards of both parties to a transaction,
or acquire pecuniary gain from a transaction that is not extended to
the corporation or its shareholders. 0
The NCBC's failure to develop a standard of review that echoes
Delaware courts' consideration of whether a deal protection
provision arises as a pro-active measure or a defensive measure, or
whether the transaction involves a change of control or conflict of
21.
22.
23.
2000).
24.
25.
1986).
26.
27.
28.
29.
1996).
30.

See id. at 955.
Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361,1367 (Del. 1995).
See In re Gaylord Container S'holders Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 484-85 (Del. Ch.
Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1389.
See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del.
See id.
571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
Id. at 1150.
Herlihy, supra note 15, at 304; see Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1384-85 (Del.
Herlihy, supra note 15, at 304.
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interest, is problematic. The court fails to establish a tri-leveled test,
grounded in the business judgment rule with increasing levels of
scrutiny applied as the potential for director conflict of interest
increases. Instead the review is a catch-all standard, derived in part
from a comment made in a recent article by Delaware Vice
Chancellor Leo E. Strine, Jr.31 and from the NCBC's interpretation of
section 55-8-30(d) of the General Statutes of North Carolina,3 2 that
essentially finds invalid any coercive deal protection provision.
Strine does not suggest supplanting Delaware law with such a
coercive test. Rather, his article advocates an approach that focuses
on uncoerced shareholder choice as a practical way to balance
shareholder and director interests 4 Indeed, Strine suggests that the
standards of review developed in Delaware are still applicable. The
court utilizes his article as a summary of Delaware case law, though it
is only an "explor[ation of] some of the doctrinal tensions posed by
deal protection measures. ''36 Building a catch-all standard of review
from this comment misinterprets Strine and neglects the decades of
deal protection case law in Delaware.
Because North Carolina has not previously developed a standard
for reviewing a board's fiduciary duty in the context of corporate
mergers, 37 this decision provides the only definition of the North
Carolina duty. In its discussion of the influence of recently amended
North Carolina General Statute section 55-8-30(d), 5 the NCBC
indicated that the business judgment rule has been the common law
rule in North Carolina.3 9 The NCBC concluded that the amendment
31. Strine, supra note 6, at 941.
32. Section 55-8-30 was amended by the addition of subsection (d). Act of July 24,
1993, ch. 552, § 11, 1993 N.C. Sess. Laws 2912, 2917. "The duties of a director weighing a
change of control situation shall not be any different, nor the standard of care any higher,
than otherwise provided in this section." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-8-30(d) (2002) (amended
1993).
33. See First Union Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., No. 01-CVS-10075, 67-70 (N.C.
Bus. Ct. Aug. 10, 2001), at http://www.ncbusinesscourt.nettopinions/2001%20NCBC%
2009A.pdf (last visited May 6,2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
34. See Strine, supranote 6, at 941.
35. See Allen, supra note 6, at 1319 (urging that the Unocal intermediate standard
should continue to govern all objectively defensive actions taken by boards of directors);
id. at 1320 (suggesting that the current Unocal/Unitrin"standard's focus on preclusion and
coercion is functionally useful and should be retained").
36. Strine, supra note 6, at 920.
37. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
69-70.
38. See FirstUnion, No. 01-CVS-10075,
39. See id. 69 n.111 (citing State ex rel. Long v. ILA Corp., 132 N.C. App. 587, 601,
513 S.E.2d 812, 821 (1999)); see also Winters v. First Union Corp., No. 01-CVS-5362, 15
(N.C. Bus. Ct. July 13, 2001), at http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/opinions/2001%20NCBC
%2008.htm (last visited May 6,2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review) (citing
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was directed at Revlon, and not at the Unocal standard of review."
Without explicitly stating so, the NCBC assumed that it is appropriate
to have a Unocal-type standard of review" regardless of the context
of a deal protection provision, despite just previously citing to a North
Carolina decision supporting the business judgment rule. The NCBC
failed to entertain two alternative methods of applying the statute.
First, it might have followed the statute and North Carolina
precedent by simply applying the business judgment rule. Second,
considering the NCBC's willingness to bend the statute in order to
invoke a higher level of review, the NCBC might have adopted the
Delaware tri-level review.
The NCBC's coercive test thus originates from a misconstruction
of Vice Chancellor Strine's article and a disregard of North Carolina
precedent which could have been avoided through an alternate
statutory construction of section 55-8-30(d). When compared to
Delaware, North Carolina appears to have both a stricter and more
lenient duty, depending on the circumstances. For example, in a
situation where Delaware would apply the traditional business
judgment rule, North Carolina would appear to impose a stricter
42
duty, i.e., its coercive test, which is based on the Unocal test.
However, in a situation where Delaware would apply the entire
fairness review, North Carolina would appear to impose a more
lenient duty by again applying the Unocal based coercive test.4 3
Although several states have enacted statutes similar to section 55-830(d) to prevent their courts from adopting stricter modes of review
(e.g., from the traditional business judgment rule to Delaware's
enhanced scrutiny and entire fairness reviews),' no state has
Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1142 (Del. 1989)) (applying
North Carolina law and holding that "the decision to enter into a merger agreement is a
decision for the board of directors that is subject to review under the business judgment
rule"). Under the business judgment rule, the decision of a "loyal and informed board will
not be overturned by a court unless it cannot be attributed to any rational business
purpose." Long, 132 N.C. App. at 602, 513 S.E.2d at 822 (citing RUSSELL M. ROBINSON
II, ROBINSON ON NORTH CAROLINA CORPORATION LAW § 14.6 (5th ed. 1995)).
40. FirstUnion, No. 01-CVS-10075, 170.
41. The NCBC finds support for this contention in its interpretation of Vice
Chancellor Strine's article. See supra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
42. See First Union, No. 01-CVS-10075, 70.
43. See id. North Carolina's standard does not contain a preclusive component, which
is included in Delaware's first level of enhanced scrutiny (which is the most lenient among
Delaware's first level of enhanced scrutiny (Unocal), second level of scrutiny (Revlon),
and entire fairness standards).
44. Several states reject Delaware's deal protection provisions, thereby relying solely
on the business judgment rule, which gives directors more flexibility, greater freedom-ofcontract, and the ability to weigh factors other than shareholder value. John J. Jenkins,
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developed a body of law that is both less restrictive and more
restrictive than Delaware.
Adding to the confusion, the NCBC uses as persuasive precedent

individual Delaware cases 5 applying different tiers of review to justify
the Unocal tier it universally adopts. Because the NCBC failed to
flesh out the entire tri-leveled Delaware test, the NCBC's standard of
review will lead to results contrary to those in Delaware, despite its

"reliance" upon Delaware cases. North Carolina's test is not a
sophisticated, situation-specific, tri-leveled method of analyzing deal
protection provisions, and it therefore fails to enable North Carolina
courts to vary their level of review as the potential director conflict of

interest varies. North Carolina would be better served had the NCBC
followed Delaware's lead. The NCBC's coercive test will allow selfinterested transactions that Delaware would invalidate under Revlon

review, and thus fails to adequately protect shareholders. It will also
possibly invalidate mere business decisions that Delaware would
uphold under the business judgment rule. The NCBC makes a
functional error in looking to Delaware for precedent and failing to
accurately apply the case law, and makes a substantive error in failing
to establish tri-leveled review, which is the better test.
Although the NCBC did not attempt to determine the standard
of review that Delaware would have applied, the strong analogy
between First Union and Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time
Inc.46 suggests that First Union should be subject to the traditional
business judgment rule. 47 Absent unusual circumstances, a board's
careful, deliberative, and thorough review process triggers the
traditional business judgment rule review. In Time, the Delaware
court upheld the deal protection provisions despite their severity

What's the Big Deal?, BUS. L. TODAY, Nov./Dec. 2000, at 32, 36 (stating that several large
states, including Indiana, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, have refused
Delaware's approach to deal protections by adopting anti-Unocal statutes). Likewise,
many directors shun Delaware's focus on shareholders at the expense of director and
other stakeholder interests. E.g., BRYAN BURROUGH & JoIHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS
AT THE GATE vii (Harper & Row 1990) (quoting Adolphus Green, founder of Nabisco:
"The officer of every corporation should feel in his heart-in his very soul-that he is
responsible, not merely to make dividends for the stockholders of his company, but to
enhance the general prosperity and the moral sentiment of the United States.").
45. See infra notes 46-49 and 65-80 and accompanying text.
46. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
47. See id. at 1152 (applying business judgment rule to decision to enter into TimeWarner merger transaction); id. at 1142 (stating that there is no duty to negotiate with a
third party in the context of a strategic merger); id. at 1152 ("We have repeatedly stated
that the refusal [of directors] to entertain an offer may comport with the valid exercise of a
board's business judgment.").
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because it found that the Time board had entered into the merger
agreement with Warner after a careful, deliberative, and thorough
process.4 8 Specifically, the Time board carefully considered strategic
combinations over more than a year and held informal discussions
with several companies.4 9 It considered and rejected Paramount as a
potential merger partner.5 0 After a rigorous process, the Time board
concluded that a combination with Warner was likely to lead to the
best long-term value for shareholders and therefore entered into a
The Time deal protection
merger agreement with Warner."
provisions were extensive and included a lock-up agreement, 52 a noshop provision preventing Time from considering any other
consolidation proposal, and "dry-up" agreements pursuant to which
Time paid various institutions to not finance a hostile bid against it.5 '
Most significantly, the court held that despite its potential
interference with shareholder value, Time was allowed to prevent a
shareholder vote entirely by switching to a cash deal.54
First Union bears striking similarities to Time. First Union and
Wachovia entered into their merger agreement after a careful,
deliberative, and thorough process, just as the parties in Time did,
Additionally, because the
suggesting that Time should apply. 5
termination fee and lockout agreement in First Union were less
severe than removing a shareholder vote entirely, as occurred in

48. Id. at 1154-55.
49. Id. at 1154.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Lock-up fees are a type of termination fee. E.g., Stephen R. Volk et al.,
Negotiating Business Combination Agreements-The "Sellers" Point of View, 33 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 1077, 1110-11 (1996) ("Break-up fees and lock-up stock options make it
more expensive for a third party to compete with the original acquiror. The third party
not only must pay the stockholders for their shares, but also must bear the cost of the
transaction protection devices."); see also supranote 3.
53. Time, 571 A.2d at 1146.
54. Id. at 1148.
55. See First Union Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, Inc., No. 01-CVS-10075, 130-41 (N.C.
Bus. Ct. Aug. 10, 2001), at http://www.ncbusinesscourt.net/opinions/2001%20NCBC%
2009A.pdf (last visited May 6,2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). "[The
Wachovia board's] selection of First Union as a merger partner was consistent with a
thoroughly studied and well-conceived business strategy ... ." Id. 132. "This was an
informed, independent, fully functional, intelligent, engaged and knowledgeable board."
Id. 133. "[The board] was under no duty to structure its merger proposal with First
Union to permit an interloping bid from SunTrust." Id. 135. "[The board] properly
relied on their advisors and they understood and made the key decision with sufficient
knowledge and understanding." Id. 141. "[The board] had studied other strategic
merger possibilities and determined this was the best." Id.
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Time, the provisions in First Union should have been permitted under
the traditional business judgment rule standard.
The NCBC's decision includes other examples where it was hasty
in both its use and disregard of non-North Carolina cases as
persuasive precedent. For example, although the court noted that
"resort[ing] to prior decisions ...[may] provide help in its legal
analysis of coercion,"56 it failed to apply a case that was especially on
point. In Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co.,57 the
Delaware Chancery court indicated in dictum that a 6.3% termination
fee in a merger agreement that included a no-talk provision would
likely be coercive under Unocal's enhanced scrutiny review. 58
Though its statement is not precedent, the Delaware Chancery Court
would likely find its own dictum persuasive. Considering the fact that
the First Union-Wachovia merger agreement contained provisions
similarly restrictive to termination fees and no-talk provisions, it
follows that the termination fee in First Union-Wachovia's agreement
would have been deemed coercive under Unocal.9 Consequently, the
First-Union Wachovia termination fee, at a level of 6%, should have
been rejected under North Carolina's coercive test.'
Also, the
general understanding that 1-5% is the permissible range of
termination fees for Delaware, with larger transactions typically
falling on the lower side of this range, 61 provides additional support
for rejecting the termination provision. In other words, if the NCBC
looks to Delaware to determine what is coercive (as it claimed to do
and arguably should have done), then the termination provision was
coercive and thus under the coercive test the court developed, it
should have been rejected.62 The court's failure to reject the
termination provision is inconsistent with either its claim to rely on
Delaware law or with the test it developed itself.

56. See id. 85.
57. C.A. No. 17398, 1999 Del. Ch.LEXIS 202 (Del. Ch. Sept. 27,1999).
58. See id. at *2 (noting that a 6.3% termination fee appears unreasonable).
59. The First Union-Wachovia merger agreement contained a lockout provision and a
termination fee. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
60. Although Delaware precedent suggests that a termination fee should be rejected
at this level, another possibility suggested by some Delaware judges is to reduce the
termination fee. See Strine, supra note 6, at 941 n.71.
61. Charles M. Nathan, Deal Defense, THE DEAL, June 21, 2001, available at
http:1208.185.43.170/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=TheDeallTDDArticlelStand
ardArticle&c=TDDArticle&cid=1003865097537 (last visited May 6,2002) (on file with the
North Carolina Law Review); see also Matador Capital Mgmt. Corp. v. BRC Holdings,
Inc., 729 A.2d 280,291 (Del. Ch. 1998).
62. See supra text accompanying notes 31-45.
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The NCBC also neglected relevant case law in the context of
analyzing First Union's six month lockout provision. The NCBC's
statement that "[t]his court is not aware of any judicial blessing of
non-termination clauses similar to this one"'63 overlooks CSX Corp. v.
Norfolk Southern Corp.,' a case which included a judicial blessing of
a non-termination clause involving an eight month and a two year
lockout. The district court applied the traditional business judgment
rule under Pennsylvania law and concluded that the eight month
lockout was not coercive. 65 Likewise, the district court denied
Norfolk's request for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of
the two year lockout.6 6
159 (N.C. Bus. Ct.
63. First Union Corp. v. SunTrust Banks, No. 01-CVS-10075,
Aug. 10, 2001), at http://www.ncbusinesscourt.nettopinions/2001%20NCBC%2009A.pdf
(last visited May 6,2002) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
64. The litigation among Conrail, CSX, and NS ultimately involved three preliminary
injunction hearings in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, a motion before that court for a temporary restraining order, and two oral
arguments before the Third Circuit Court of Appeals. The case produced a number of
opinions. See Karen L. Valihura & Leonard P. Stark, Fiduciary Duties Derailed?
Appropriation of Directors'Duties in the Battle for Control of Conrail,24 J. CORP. LAW
29, 32 n.12 (1998) (citing Preliminary Injunction Hearing Transcript, Norfolk S. Corp. v.
Conrail, Inc., C.A. No. 96-7167, at 596 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 1996) (bench ruling) (denying
preliminary injunction to enjoin first step of CSX's tender offer for 19.9% of Conrail's
shares) [hereinafter November Preliminary Injunction Hearing Transcript]; Preliminary
Injunction Hearing Transcript, Norfolk S. Corp. v. Conrail, Inc., C.A. No. 96-7167 (E.D.
Pa. Dec. 17, 1996) (bench ruling) (enjoining Conrail from indefinitely delaying
shareholder vote on charter amendment); Preliminary Injunction Hearing Transcript,
Norfolk S. Corp. v. Conrail, Inc., C.A. No. 96-7167 (E.D. Pa. Jan 9, 1997) (bench ruling)
(denying preliminary injunction motion based on fiduciary duty breach in 720-day lockout
and on contention that control transaction had already occurred) [hereinafter January
Preliminary Injunction Hearing Transcript]; Norfolk S. Corp. v. Ferrara, 111 F.3d 127 (3rd
Cir. 1997) (affirming district court's denial of preliminary injunctions in November and
January)). See generally Vincent F. Garrity, Jr. & Mark A. Morton, Would the
CSX/Conrail Express Have Derailed in Delaware? A ComparativeAnalysis of Lock-Up
Provisions Under Delaware and Pennsylvania Law, 51 U. MIAMI L. Rv. 677 (1997)
(examining whether the Delaware courts would have reached the same conclusion
concerning the adoption and use of the "lock-up" provisions if the litigation had been filed
in the Delaware Court of Chancery and Conrail had been a Delaware, rather than a
Pennsylvania, corporation, and concluding that it is likely that the Delaware courts, unlike
the district court, would have invalidated some or all of the provisions employed by
Conrail and CSX); Comment, The Sale of Conrail: Pennsylvania'sAnti-Takeover Statutes
versus ShareholderInterests, 72 TuL. L. REv. 1369 (1998) (exploring the efficacy of the
Pennsylvania Business Corporation Law's anti-takeover provisions and the legacies of the
Conrail deal).
65. See Garrity & Morton, supra note 64, at 689 (citing November Preliminary
Injunction Hearing Transcript, supra note 64, at 652). The court found no coercion, "but
only several options, any of which will undoubtedly end up being a net return to most
shareholders far in excess of whatever their original investment may have been." Id.
66. See id. (citing January Preliminary Injunction Hearing Transcript, supra note 64,
at 161).
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Rather than applying CSX, the NCBC analogized the First Union
merger to Quickturn Design Systems, Inc. v. Shapiro.67 The NCBC's
reliance on Quickturn to support its rejection of the lockout provision

seems misplaced for several reasons. 68 In Quickturn, the board
adopted a slow-hand provision69 that was unredeemable for six
months by a newly elected board.7" The Delaware Supreme Court
held the slow-hand provision invalid because it "impermissibly
deprive[d] any newly elected board" of its authority to manage the
corporation.7' The fundamental principle at issue in Quickturn, that
shareholders have the ultimate right to elect directors who will do
their bidding, was not at issue in First Union.72 First Union, instead of
dealing with a potential abrogation of shareholder power to elect
empowered directors, dealt with a board decision to enter a
contractual deal protection provision.73
Shareholder concerns
regarding the method by which their directors will bid, which may
include deal protection provisions, must be taken into account when

electing directors. Quickturn protects shareholders' ability to steer
the board's bidding process solely by protecting shareholders' voting
rights.
It does not support interfering with contractual deal
protection provisions employed by rightfully elected directors.
Another distinction stems from the fact that Quickturn arose in the
context of an existing battle,74 invoking Unocal, whereas First Union
involved a pro-active agreement, 75 invoking Time or the traditional

business judgment rule.

67. 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998).
68. The NCBC made an analogy between the Quickturn no-hand provision and the
lockout arrangement as part of its reasoning for rejecting the lockout arrangement. First
Union, No. 01-CVS-10075, 157.
69. A slow-hand provision (or no-hand provision) suspends, limits, or eliminates the
board's ability to redeem a poison pill once a majority of the board has been replaced.
FLEISCHER & SuSSMAN, supra note 2, at 5-7. A poison pill (or rights plan) is generally a
right to buy shares in the merged firm at a bargain price. Id. at 5-102. The right is granted
to the firm's shareholders, contingent on another firm acquiring control. Id. The right
dilutes the stock such that the bidding firm loses money on its shares. Id.
70. Quickturn Design Sys., 721 A.2d at 1288.
71. Id. at 1291.
72. See id. at 1291-92. "Quickturn focuses on the features of the slow hand pill itself,
not the identity of the actor that implemented the provision." John C. Coates IV &
Bradley C. Faris, Second-GenerationShareholderBylaws: Post-QuickturnAlternatives, 56
Bus. LAW. 1323, 1331 (2001). "Quickturn should thus not be read to encompass ali types
of corporate bylaws and contracts." Id. at 1331.
73. See FirstUnion, No. 01-CVS-10075, 156.
74. See Quickturn Design Sys., 72 1 A.2d at 1287.
75. See FirstUnion, No. 01-CVS-10075. 130-41.
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Finally, the NCBC's use of Paramount Communications,Inc. v.
QVC Network Inc.76 failed to adequately distinguish QVC from First
Union. The NCBC cited QVC to support two statements: (1) "Thus,
the [Delaware] court made clear that a board's fiduciary obligations
supercede their right to enter into contracts on behalf of the
corporation."7 7 (2) "At each turn, the Delaware Courts have
invalidated plans that purport to restrict a board's duty to fully
protect the interests of the corporation and its shareholders."'78 QVC
involved reactive provisions in the midst of a battle (which would
trigger at least Unocal, but in fact triggered Revlon7 9 because it
involved a change of control) 0 rather than provisions put in place
consistent with a long-term plan as in Time and First Union." Also,
by holding that Revlon is still good law, QVC did not overrule Time.8
Considering the close nature of the Wachovia shareholder vote,
the NCBC's decision was likely a material factor in making the First
Union-Wachovia merger a reality. Though the NCBC allowed the
merger to be completed, its decision oversimplifies the realities
surrounding deal protection provisions and fails to establish a trileveled system of review, with increasing levels of scrutiny applied as
the potential for director conflict of interest increases. In addition to
ignoring the complexities surrounding deal protection provisions, the
First Union decision sets a dangerous precedent by allowing North
Carolina courts to use Delaware cases as persuasive precedent
without regard to the standard of review applied by Delaware in
those cases. Ultimately, the NCBC's test falls short of both protecting
shareholders in Revlon situations and encouraging legitimate business
decisions in the business judgment rule context. A complete
reassessment of the NCBC's attempt to balance shareholder power
and board authority in corporate mergers is in order.
PAUL A. KUEBLER

76. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
77. First Union, No. 01-CVS-10075, $ 53.
78. Id. 188.
79. See supranotes 15-30 and accompanying text.
80. See Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 46-48
(Del. 1994).
81. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1146-47 (Del.
130-41.
1989); First Union, No. 01-CVS-10075,
82. See QVC, 637 A.2d at 46-48.
83. See supranote 4 and accompanying text.

